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A STRUGGLE OF FOREIGN POLICY, STATE POWER, 
AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FACULTY SENATE OF 
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY V. FLORIDA 
Joy Blanchard∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
. . . It is highly needful, in the interest of society at large, that 
what purport to be the conclusions of men trained for, and 
dedicated to, the quest for truth, shall in fact be the 
conclusions of such men, and not echoes of the opinions of the 
lay public, or of the individuals who endow or manage 
universities. 
–1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Academic Tenure1 
Academic freedom, though one of the most venerated 
principles in academe,2 is a somewhat amorphous notion3—
particularly as the ways in which schools deliver knowledge,4 
 
∗ Joy Blanchard is an Assistant Professor of Higher Education at Florida International 
University. Honors B.S., University of Louisiana at Lafayette; M.S., Florida State Uni-
versity; Ph.D., University of Georgia. Sincere thanks to Professor David Rabban and 
Professor David Hollinger for their most helpful comments on earlier drafts of this pa-
per. 
 1  Edwin R. A. Seligman et al., General Report of the Committee on Academic 
Freedom and Academic Tenure, BULL. AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS, Vol. 1, No. 1, at 15, 25 
(Dec. 1915) available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40216731 [hereinafter 1915 Decla-
ration].  
 2  Courts often defer to the de facto rights granted by the American Association 
of University Professors through the organization’s various statements on academic 
freedom, tenure, copyright, and collective bargaining. See, e.g., Donna R. Euben, De 
Facto Tenure (2005), AAUP (July 2005), http://www.aaup.org/issues/tenure//de-facto-
tenure-2005. 
 3  Whether academic freedom belongs to the faculty or institution is a continual 
debate. Also, whether it truly is a constitutional issue or simply de facto practice 
stemming from AAUP standards and policy statements is currently debated. See, e.g., 
David M. Rabban, Academic Freedom, Individual or Institutional?, 87 ACADEME 16 
(2001). 
 4  Institutions such as Columbia University and New York University have 
spent millions in online education without success. Increasingly, universities are using 
online education as a tool to increase revenue from enrollment without having to in-
crease infrastructure. See Michael W. Klein, ‘The Equitable Rule’: Copyright Ownership 
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govern, and fund themselves5 continually evolve. With the 
changing nature of academe, both institutional policy and 
jurisprudential thought have changed. 
Since the McCarthy-era landmark cases of the 1950s,6 
faculty have won rights via broad interpretations of the 
Constitution and judicial deference to the notion of academic 
freedom. However, some of those rights won in court (e.g., the 
right to free speech as a private citizen or pundit7) as well as 
rights venerated in practice (e.g., ownership of course materials 
and copyrightable works8) have become blurred as the nature 
of academe, governance structures, and legal opinions have 
shifted. One controlling question today is whether academic 
freedom is a right of the faculty or of the institution.9 
In Florida, interpretations of a controversial state law are 
an example in which the custom of free inquiry has been 
challenged. In 2006, then-Governor Jeb Bush signed into law 
what is commonly referred to as the Travel Act (“the Act”),10 
which prohibits the use of state funds to sponsor research or 
travel to countries designated by the U.S. Department of State 
 
of Distance-Education Courses, 31 J.C. & U.L. 143, 174 (2004). 
 5  State universities are receiving fewer funds from legislatures. Increasingly, 
universities are asked to become “privatized” and seek support through “soft money,” 
such as grants, private donations, and commercialized inventions. See, e.g., DAVID L. 
KIRP, SHAKESPEARE, EINSTEIN, AND THE BOTTOM LINE: THE MARKETING OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION (Harvard University Press 2004). 
 6  See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (ruling that a New York 
statute that allowed public school teachers to be dismissed because of their affiliation 
with subversive organizations was constitutional); Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234 (1957) 
(finding that the investigation of a professor’s political associations was an unconstitu-
tional invasion of privacy); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (overturn-
ing a state law requiring public university professors to sign affidavits that they were 
not members of the Communist Party). 
 7  The line of cases regarding the free speech rights of public employees began 
with Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (establishing a three-prong test that 
grants more rights to employees the closer their speech is to a matter of public concern) 
and has been most recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that the closer the nexus of an employee’s speech to the 
terms of employment, the less right to free speech he enjoys).  
 8  There is a de facto “teacher exception” to the work for hire doctrine under the 
Copyright Act that grants faculty members rights to their class notes, courses, and cre-
ative works. See generally Joy Blanchard, The Teacher Exception Under the Work for 
Hire Doctrine: Safeguard of Academic Freedom or Vehicle for Academic Free Enter-
prise?, 35 INNOVATIVE HIGHER EDUC. 61 (2010).  
 9  In 2000, the Fourth Circuit upheld a Virginia statute that prohibited profes-
sors from accessing sexually explicit materials on state-owned computers without prior 
consent, holding that any rights via academic freedom belonged to the university, not 
to the individual professors. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 10  See Fla. Stat. §1011.90(6); Fla. Stat. §112.061(3)(e) (2011). 
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as sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and 
Syria. The language of the Act is so broad that it has been 
interpreted to prohibit research sponsored by federal grants or 
by funds from private donors because processing the awards 
and paperwork would involve state resources.11 The Florida 
Travel Act compromises basic notions of academic freedom by 
taking academic decision-making ability from universities and 
giving it to the legislature. 
This paper will examine the legal and historical 
antecedents of academic freedom, particularly the tradition 
held by courts to defer to institutions on academic decisions. 
The paper will then examine the case challenging Florida’s 
Travel Act, discuss a 2013 ruling from the 11th Circuit that 
conflicts with the court’s stance regarding the Act, and argue 
why this statute should have been stricken by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
II. BACKGROUND ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
“Academic freedom is conceived of as the price the public 
must pay in return for the social good of advancing 
knowledge.”12 However, well into the start of the 20th century, 
presidents of American universities dismissed faculty who held 
unpopular beliefs.13 With the advent of modernism and 
advances in science, American academe finally began to 
embrace the notion of individuality in a quest for knowledge 
 
 11  Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l U. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 12  See Robert Post, The Structure of Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 73 (Beshara Doumani ed., Zone Books 2006). 
 13  During World War I, professors were often fired for pacifist views. See, e.g., 
Rachel E Fugate, Choppy Waters are Forecast for Academic Free Speech, 26 FLA. ST. 
U.L. REV. 187, 189 (1998); R. Kenton Bird & Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Academic Free-
dom and 9/11: How the War on Terrorism Threatens Free Speech on Campus, 7 COMM. 
L. & POL’Y 431, 447 (2002); Jennifer Elrod, Academics, Public Employee Speech, and the 
Public University, 22 BUFF. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 1, 14 (2003). At Stanford University, 
Mrs. Leland Stanford called for the dismissal of a professor who supported the free sil-
ver market and denounced Asian immigration in favor of Anglo-Saxon purity; this was 
a major impetus for the start of the American Association of University Professors. See, 
e.g., Sonya G. Smith, Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College: The Scope of Academic 
Freedom Within the Context of Sexual Harassment Claims and In-Class Speech, 25 J. 
OF C. & U L. 1 (1998). The first president of Harvard resigned over controversy sur-
rounding infant baptism and antebellum professors were fired over their opinions of 
slavery. See TIMOTHY REESE CAIN, ESTABLISHING ACADEMIC FREEDOM: POLITICS, 
PRINCIPLES, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORE VALUES 2, 4−7 (Palgrave Macmillan 
2012). 
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and truth. Taken from the German concepts of Lehrreiheit 
(freedom to teach), Lernfreiheit (freedom to learn), and Freiheit 
der Wissenschaft (academic self-governance),14 the 1915 
Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic 
Tenure issued by the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP) has become a de facto creed within higher 
education.15 
In 1952, the term “academic freedom” was first recognized 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Adler v. Board of Education.16 In 
their dissent, Justices Douglas and Black decried the New York 
public school loyalty oaths: “There can be no real academic 
freedom . . . . [W]here suspicion fills the air and holds scholars 
in line for fear of their jobs, there can be no free exercise of 
intellect. Supineness and dogmatism take the place of 
inquiry.”17 In 1957, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,18 the “four 
essential freedoms” of the academy were first set forth: who 
may teach, what will be taught, how it will be taught, and who 
will be admitted.19 The Court famously stated 
[t]o impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in 
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our 
Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended 
by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made . . . . 
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to 
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and 
die.20 
 
 14  See, e.g., Stacy E. Smith, Who Owns Academic Freedom?: The Standard for 
Academic Free Speech at Public Universities, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 299, 309 (2002). 
Academic self-government, Freiheit der Wissenschaft, was espoused to counter the 
threat of censorship. See Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Defini-
tions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1270 (1988).  
 15  The Statement analogizes federal judges and the President to faculty and 
trustees—and how the latter should not interfere with the work of the former. See 1915 
Declaration, supra note 1. The AAUP softened its stance during World War I, as neu-
trality to global politics was the position of choice for the time. The nascent AAUP was 
tested at its core at a time when patriotism was at its highest. See Cain, supra note 13, 
at 51−73. 
 16  342 U.S. 485 (1952).  
 17  Id. at 510. 
 18  354 U.S. 234 (1957).  
 19  Id. at 263. 
 20  Id. at 250. Arguably, even before Sweezy, institutional academic freedom was 
established when the U.S. Supreme Court did not allow state legislatures to revoke 
college charters. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 624−712 
(1819), cited in Metzger, supra note 14, at 1315. 
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The Sweezy case as well as the landmark Keyishian v. 
Board of Regents21 were among the first court decisions to 
introduce the notion that academic freedom was not just an 
individual right, but one of the institution.22 Since then, courts 
have continued to recognize not just the need for faculty to be 
free to inquire, but also for the institution to pursue its mission 
absent of court and/or legislative interference. This notion was 
reinforced by Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, arguing that there exists an 
institutional need “to be free from government interference in 
its core administrative activities.”23 In Regents of University of 
Michigan v. Ewing, citing Sweezy24 and Keyishian,25 the Court 
noted, “academic freedom thrives . . . on autonomous decision-
making of the academy itself.”26 And in the seminal affirmative 
action case Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
the importance of academic deference, stating that universities 
“occupy a special niche in constitutional tradition”27 and that 
they enjoy substantial “educational autonomy”28 that requires 
deference to the decisions they make related to the mission of 
higher education.29 
In 1999, the Fourth Circuit court recognized academic 
freedom as belonging to the institution—but to the detriment of 
scholarly freedom in research and teaching.30 In Urofsky v. 
 
 21  385 U.S. 589 (1967). In that opinion Justice Brennan wrote, “[o]ur [n]ation is 
deeply committed to safe-guarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to 
all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.” Id at 603. 
 22  In Griswold v. Connecticut, a case regarding a constitutional right to privacy 
regarding contraceptive use, the Court stated, “the State may not, consistently with the 
spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right 
of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the 
right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read . . . and freedom of inquiry, 
freedom of thought, and freedom to teach . . .—indeed the freedom of the entire univer-
sity community.” 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), cited in William Van Alstyne, The Specific 
Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, 404 ANNALS OF THE 
AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 140, 180 (1972).   
 23  See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A ‘Special Concern of the First 
Amendment’, 99 YALE L.J. 251, 257 (1989), (citing 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). That case up-
held the state’s program to diversify the student body in the UC Davis medical school.  
 24  354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
 25  385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 26  474 U.S. 214, 226 n. 12 (1985).  
 27  539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
 28  Id. at 363. 
 29  See Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 2004 U. OF SAN DIEGO SCH. OF 
L. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES 1, 3 (2004). 
 30  The rationale used by the court in this case will be used later in this paper to 
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Gilmore, six faculty members from various public institutions 
challenged a Virginia statute that prohibited the access of 
sexually-related material from state computers without 
obtaining prior approval.31 The statute used the term “sexually 
explicit” to include non-obscene materials in the provisions.32 
The intent of the statute was to mitigate exposure to sexual 
harassment claims, but the court record showed no history of 
disruption to the efficiency of the workplace nor was any 
hostile work environment complaints filed.33 Arguing that the 
statute violated First Amendment freedoms, the professors 
contended that the material accessed from the Internet was 
used in the scope of research.34 
The court held that any constitutional rights of academic 
freedom belonged not to the professors but to the public 
universities where they were employed.35 The court concluded 
that the expression was related to the scope of the 
employment,36 was not a matter of public concern,37 and that 
the Virginia statute was not overbroad.38 The court reasoned 
that “the government is entitled to control the content of the 
speech because it has in a meaningful sense ‘purchased’ the 
 
argue that the Florida Travel Act should be struck down. 
 31  216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 32  See Kate Williams, Loss of Academic Freedom on the Internet: The Fourth 
Circuit’s Decision in Urofsky v. Gilmore, 21 REV. LITIG. 493, 497 (2002). A professor who 
typically gave an assignment for students to evaluate the Communications Decency Act 
could no longer assign it to students because, under the statute, he could not view the 
materials his students were accessing. Id. at 499. One professor was studying Pulitzer 
Prize-winning Toni Morrison’s “Beloved” but could not access information on the Inter-
net without permission because the book discusses rape and sodomy. Id. at 512. Ac-
cording to Williams, the Act infringes on academic freedom by compelling the universi-
ty to monitor otherwise legal uses of the Internet. Id. at 508.  
 33  See David Hostetler, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 1 PRINCIPAL 
LEADERSHIP 26 (2001); Rebecca Gose Lynch, Pawns of the State or Priests of Democra-
cy? Analyzing Professors’ Academic Freedom Rights Within the State’s Managerial 
Realm, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1061 (2003).  
 34  In his dissent, Justice Murnaghan noted that the Act only addressed online 
material. The intent was to head off sexual harassment lawsuits, but a professor would 
run afoul of the Act by researching Victorian poetry but not by leaving copies of Hustler 
Magazine around the office. Id at 440, as cited in Williams, supra note 32, at 523.  
 35  See Lynch, supra note 33; Rabban, supra note 3.  
 36  In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court upheld a similarly restrictive view 
of public employee free speech. See 547 U.S. 410 (2006).  
 37  A previous line of Supreme Court cases recognizes a public employee’s right 
to speak out on matters of public concern. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 
(1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 
(1994).  
 38  Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 416 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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speech at issue through a grant of funding or payment of a 
salary.”39 
III. CHALLENGE TO THE FLORIDA TRAVEL ACT 
Though the Fourth Circuit judges in the Urofsky case would 
not agree, the forefathers insisted that approval of governing 
bodies should not limit American academic freedom. Arthur 
Lovejoy, a professor at Johns Hopkins University who co-
authored the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration, said, “the distinctive 
social function of the scholar’s trade can not be fulfilled if those 
who pay the piper are permitted to call the tune.”40 Professor 
William Van Alstyne, preeminent scholar in the field of 
academic freedom, argued in his seminal 1972 article that “[t]o 
condition the employment or personal freedom of the teacher-
scholar upon the institutional or societal approval of his 
academic investigation or utterances  . . . is to abridge his 
academic freedom.”41 The case in Florida involves precisely 
these ominous conditions. Prior to presenting arguments as to 
why the Travel Act is unconstitutional, a background of the 
litigation at hand is warranted. 
In 2006, then-Governor Jeb Bush of Florida signed into law 
Fla. Stat. §1011.90 and §112.061, commonly referred to as the 
“Travel Act,” which prohibits the use of state funds to countries 
designated by the U.S. Department of State as sponsors of 
terrorism42: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. The 
 
 39  Id. at 408. 
 40  Arthur O. Lovejoy, Professional Association or Trade Union?, BULL. AM. 
ASS’N U. PROFESSORS, Vol. 24, No. 5, at 409, 414 (1938). 
 41  William W. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the 
General Issue of Civil Liberty, 404 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 140, 147 (1972) 
available at http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/792/. 
 42  See FLA. STAT. § 1011.90 (2010) (“None of the state or nonstate funds made 
available to state universities may be used to implement, organize, direct, coordinate, 
or administer, or to support the implementation, organization, direction, coordination, 
or administration of, activities related to or involving travel to a terrorist state. For 
purposes of this section, ‘terrorist state’ is defined as any state, country, or nation des-
ignated by the United States Department of State as a state sponsor of terrorism.”); 
See also FLA. STAT. § 112.061 (2011) (“Travel expenses of public officers or employees 
for the purpose of implementing, organizing, directing, coordinating, or administering, 
or supporting the implementation, organization, direction, coordination, or administra-
tion of, activities related to or involving travel to a terrorist state shall not be allowed 
under any circumstances. For purposes of this section, ‘terrorist state’ is defined as any 
state, country, or nation designated by the United States Department of State as a 
state sponsor of terrorism.”). 
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Faculty Senate of Florida International University challenged 
the Act in light of important research-related relationships 
many of its faculty have with Cuba. The University claimed 
that the statute violated 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution, the Foreign Commerce Clause of 
the Constitution, and First Amendment academic freedom, 
speech, and expressive conduct.43 The plaintiffs argued that the 
Travel Act interferes with Presidential powers, granted by 
Congress, to sanction and control relationships with certain 
countries.44 The state countered, arguing that academics and 
students are not wholly restricted from travelling to these 
countries, but must do so at their own expense.45 
The Faculty Senate lost all claims in its first appearance in 
the U.S. District Court, but the judge left the issue unsettled as 
to how private funds and federal grants could fall within the 
Travel Act’s restrictions.46 When the case reappeared in U.S. 
District Court, the State of Florida stipulated that to apply the 
Act to federal grants and private funds was unconstitutional.47 
The court agreed and found that the ban on “nonstate” funds 
was a violation of federal government powers.48 However, in 
August 2010, the Eleventh Circuit overturned the prior ruling, 
stating “the Act’s brush with federal law and the foreign affairs 
of the United States is too indirect, minor, incidental, and 
peripheral to trigger the Supremacy Clause’s—undoubted—
overriding power”49 and interpreting the Act to include 
restrictions not just on direct state appropriations but also on 
private donations and federal grants.50 
 
 43  Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1203 (S.D. 
Fla. 2007). 
 44  Id. at 1204.  
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. at 1209 (“It is not clear how Florida is going to deal with those donors who 
might want their money back if the universities benefitting from their largesse are now 
required—as a result of the Travel Act—to put unwanted (or, from the donors’ perspec-
tives, prohibited) strings on the use of those donated funds. Given the somewhat puz-
zled looks of the defendants’ counsel at oral arguments when I raised issues like this 
one, I doubt very much that Florida or the defendants have given these matters much 
thought.”). 
 47  Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Bd. of Governors, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 
1335 (S.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l 
Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 48  Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ., 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1335. 
 49  Winn, 616 F.3d at 1208. 
 50  Id. (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), in 
which the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts law regarding trade with 
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In their briefs to the court, the plaintiffs explained that the 
Travel Act has halted much of their research. Faculty are 
prohibited from applying for new grants and a significant 
amount of money has gone unspent from previously existing 
federal grants.51 Lisandro Perez, professor of Sociology and 
Anthropology at FIU, is authorized by the United States to 
travel to Cuba for research.52 He is founder and director of the 
Cuban Research Institute at FIU.53 He has raised $1 million in 
private funds to award grants to faculty and students to travel 
for research.54 Erik Camayd-Freixas of the Modern Languages 
Department was awarded such a grant but, because of the 
breadth of the Travel Act, cannot go because if FIU were to 
write a “letter of introduction” to initiate his research, it would 
involve state resources.55 
Houman Sadri, associate professor of Political Science at 
the University of Central Florida, had a contract with Saqi 
Books to research Caspian politics; however, the work was 
stalled because of the Act. He claimed that he could not 
circumvent the regulations by accepting private funds because 
it would compromise his neutrality and safety while in Iran.56 
In another example, a professor hired by the University of 
Florida’s Center for Latin American Studies declined the 
position and went to the University of Virginia instead because 
the Act would have prevented her from traveling for research.57 
After the circuit court ruling, FIU clarified its academic 
policy to state that funding travel to terrorist countries is 
prohibited, “including FIU Foundation and Contract and Grant 
account.”58 Further, the University has stated that it cannot 
defend or be responsible for any accidents or incidents incurred 
while in those countries.59 If sponsored grants included travel 
to terrorist countries, directions were given to contact Division 
 
Burma as conflicting with federal policy). 
 51  Faculty Senate, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1339−40. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. at 1341. 
 56  Id. at 1340−41. 
 57  Id. at 1341−42. 
 58  Memoradum from Douglas Wartzok, Provost and Executive Vice President, to 
FIU Community (Nov. 17, 2010) (on file with author). 
 59  Id. 
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of Research staff to “plan alternatives to satisfy the award.”60 
And, finally, faculty were advised that if their students were 
conducting research that would involve travel to these 
countries “to find academically sound alternatives.”61 
Otherwise, “the student may have to reorganize their [sic] 
project or start a new project, even if it will delay attainment of 
a degree.”62 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a writ of 
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in March 2011.63 
Regarding the petition, an ACLU representative stated 
[w]e’re asking the Court to act because this law allows Florida 
to be the only state in the country with its own foreign policy 
which runs over, above, and contrary to the foreign policy of 
the United States. Having 50 individual states setting 
individual policies for travel, commerce, and communication 
with foreign nations is a clear violation of federal law not to 
mention foolish and dangerous.64 
In response to the writ of certiorari, the National Foreign 
Trade Council (NFTC) filed an amicus curiae brief in favor of 
the University.65 In it, the NFTC argued that the 11th Circuit 
panel’s decision conflicted with the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council66 and further stated that 
the decision “undermines the President’s ability to craft and 
fine-tune a uniform foreign policy on one of the most important 
international issues of our time: state sponsorship of 
terrorism.”67 The NFTC compared the FIU case to Crosby 
claiming that the state of Florida “burdens conduct”68 that 
Congress chose not to infringe upon.69 
 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id.  
 63  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Fla., 
(2011) (No 10-1139), 2011 WL 970477. 
 64  Press Release, ACLU of Fla., Florida Law Aimed at Banning Academic and 
Research Travel to Cuba (Mar. 14, 2011) available at http://aclufl.org/2011/03/14/aclu-
of-florida-asks-u-s-supreme-court-to-hear-appeal-of-floridas-academic-research-travel-
ban/. 
 65  Brief for the NFTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Faculty Senate 
of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Fla., (2011) (No 10-1139). 
 66  Id. at 3 (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)). 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. at 9. 
 69  The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 
530 U.S. 363 (2000), and Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 363 (2000), by noting 
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The NFTC’s brief further argued that when a nation is 
under trade embargo “[i]t is the policy of the United States to 
sustain vigorous scientific enterprise through scholarly 
exchange.”70 The United States has specifically excluded any 
restrictions on academic travel to Cuba.71 Therefore, the 
Florida Travel Act is attempting to supersede national policy 
regarding relations with Cuba and other countries.72 
The office of the Solicitor General also filed an amicus 
brief.73 The brief highlighted the current federal law that 
encourages foreign academic exchange: the U.S. Department of 
Education funds study abroad through Title VI of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965, the Mutual Education and Cultural 
Exchange Act of 1961, and the Fulbright-Hays programs (i.e. 
Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad, Faculty Research 
Abroad, and Group Projects Abroad).74 The brief recognized 
that the Travel Act prohibits faculty and students from 
receiving the grants that are directly distributed to the 
institution, thus interfering “with the accomplishment of 
federal objectives.”75 
Conversely, the brief filed on behalf of the State of Florida 
argued that, “[w]hile federal law may permit travel to terrorist 
states, and might even encourage academic travel, it cannot 
mandate the use of state resources to implement such a 
program.”76 Those in opposition of the Act are not arguing that 
Florida must fund such travel but should not serve to block 
alternative means, as the Act restricts the use of federal grants 
or private funds. In its brief, the State pointed out that faculty 
and students may travel to foreign countries as permitted by 
 
that the Travel Act includes no explicit penalties for travel to those countries. See Mi-
chael John Garcia & Todd Garvey, State and Local Economic Sanctions: Constitutional 
Issues, Congressional Research Service 12 (2013) (citing Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l U. 
v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 at 1209, 1211). 
 70  Brief for the NFTC, supra note 62, at 9 (citing 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(12) 
(2011)).  
 71  See 31 C.F.R. § 515.565(a) (2011), cited in Brief for the NFTC, supra note 62, 
at 11. See also 31 C.F.R. § 515.565(d) (2011) (providing that American universities can 
open bank accounts in Cuba to fund incidentals related to academic travel). 
 72  See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 25,808, 25,809 (May 13, 
1999), cited in Brief for the NFTC, supra note 62, at 19. 
 73  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l 
Univ. v. Fla. (2012) (no. 10-1139). 
 74  Id. at 13. 
 75  Id. at 15. 
 76  Brief in Opposition at 10, Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Fla. (2011) (No. 
10-1139). 
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the federal government but must pay their own way. This is an 
incredibly dangerous supposition, as one can imagine many 
important advances in knowledge that would have never been 
discovered had this always been the status quo (e.g., space 
exploration and vaccines). 
Ultimately, in July 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
the petitioners’ request for certiorari review.77 Though, as 
stated above, the Solicitor General disagreed with the standing 
interpretation of the Act, the office recommended that 
certiorari be denied because of a lack of practicality in the 
matter (i.e. the U.S. Department of Education had not funded 
academic travel to any of the restricted countries in ten years). 
The Solicitor General did, however, indicate that the court of 
appeals should further examine whether Florida may restrict 
disbursement of federal and private grants.78 
IV. THE ODEBRECHT SPLIT 
In May 2013, in Odebrecht Construction Inc. v. Florida 
Dep’t. of Transp.,79 the 11th Circuit struck down a Florida law 
that expressly addressed dealings with Cuba. In many ways 
this en banc decision by the court contradicted the panel’s 2010 
decision to uphold the Travel Act in the FIU case.80 Though the 
court did not take the opportunity to strike down the Travel 
Act, if Odebrecht were to make its way to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the Court could strike down both of the Florida laws 
that restrict dealings with Cuba. 
The “Cuba Amendment”81 prevents any company that does 
business in Cuba from bidding on Florida public contracts 
worth more than $1 million.82 Odebrecht’s Brazilian parent 
company has a set of foreign subsidiaries unrelated to the 
 
 77  Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Fla., 133 S. Ct. 21 (2012). 
 78  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 70, at 26−30. 
 79  Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268 (11th 
Cir. 2013). 
 80  See Id. at 1268 (the 11th Circuit, in addressing its inconsistency with its pan-
el ruling in Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010), 
noted that the panel “recognized that ‘these traditional state concerns could be overrid-
den’ in the event of a clear conflict with federal law or policy” citing Winn, 616 F.3d at 
1208. See also Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1287, (distinguishing the Cuba Amendment from 
the Travel Act because it did not penalize or prohibit travel to those countries.). 
 81  Fla. Stat. § 287.135, amended by 2012 Fla. Laws 196, § 2. 
 82  Fla. Stat. § 287.135. The statute also applies to any company related to a 
company that does business in Cuba. See Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1272. 
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company in Florida that does business in Cuba.83 In 2012, a 
district court granted Odebrecht Construction a preliminary 
injunction to prohibit the Florida Department of 
Transportation from enforcing the Act.84 In its ruling, the 11th 
Circuit agreed that the Cuba Amendment violates the 
Supremacy Clause under principles of “conflict preemption.”85 
“The Cuba Amendment conflicts directly with the extensive 
and highly calibrated federal regime of sanctions against Cuba 
promulgated by the legislative and executive branches over 
almost fifty years.”86 The court went on to say that the 
“Amendment also overrides the nuances of the federal law and 
weakens the President’s ability ‘to speak for the Nation with on 
voice in dealing’ with Cuba.”87 
The U.S. government’s attention to policy with Cuba has 
been long standing. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations 
(“CACR”) were first promulgated by the Treasury Department 
in 1963 and are still enforced.88 The CACR does not have 
provisions to sanction an American company like Odebrecht for 
business conducted by a foreign parent company.89 The 11th 
Circuit predicated most of its decision on the Supreme Court’s 
Crosby case, noting the Cuba Amendment “sweeps more 
broadly”90 than federal policy, has its own penalties that “go 
 
 83  Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1273. 
 84  Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2012) aff’d 
sub nom. Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268 (11th 
Cir. 2013). 
 85  Odebrecht, 715 F.3d 1268 at 1272. See also id. at 1275 (“The Supreme Court 
has instructed us that we may infer congressional intent to displace state law altogeth-
er ‘from a framework of regulation so pervasive that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it or where there is a federal interest so dominant that the feder-
al system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject’” 
citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 115 (1992)). Presidential 
power regarding setting similar foreign trade policy dates back to 1917 with the Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
app. §§1−6, 7−39, 41−44, cited in Odebrecht, 715 F.3d 1268 at 1275). 
 86  Odebrecht, 715 F.3d 1268 at 1272. 
 87  Id. at 1272, citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 
(2000). 
 88  Id. at 1275, citing 31 C.F.R. pt. 515. 
 89  Id. at 1276 (see also id. at 1279 Canada and Brazil have complained to the 
United States about the trade effects of the Cuba Amendment) (see also id. at 1280 The 
European Union, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and Singapore have expressed con-
cern about the conflicts between the Cuba Amendment and the global Agreement on 
Government Procurement). 
 90  Id. at 1281.  
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beyond federal sanctions,”91 and strips the President of power 
granted him through Congress to establish policy with Cuba. 
“Federal policy towards Cuba is long-standing, it is nuanced, it 
is highly calibrated, and it is constantly being fine-tuned.”92 
Again, though the court failed to take opportunity to 
overturn the panel decision in the FIU case,93 it noted the 
presidential policies, particularly of the Clinton and Obama 
administrations, to loosen travel sanctions with Cuba and, 
most recently with the Obama Administration, to allow 
institutions of higher education to travel there.94 Florida’s 
Travel Act flies in the face of those efforts. 
V. THE CASE AGAINST FLORIDA 
By rejecting the writ of certiorari and letting the 11th 
Circuit’s ruling stand, the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed a 
dangerous precedent in the 11th Circuit that enables additional 
meddling in faculty-funded research. As educational 
institutions are increasingly commercialized and the notion of 
“academic capitalism”95 adds pressure to scholars to produce 
knowledge that is a commodity, academic freedom may be 
further eroded by additional state regulations that affect 
academic funding.96 The presence of the “piper” that Lovejoy 
warned about could loom more frequently and more 
ominously.97 
The Travel Act should have been struck down—at least any 
interpretation that precludes the use of federal funding or 
private donations98—on the basis of institutional academic 
freedom. Section II highlights several precedents that establish 
academic freedom not just as a right of the faculty but also of 
 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. at 1278. 
 93  Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 94  Odebrecht, 715 F.3d 1268 at 1284−1285. 
 95  See generally SHEILA SLAUGHTER AND GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM 
AND THE NEW ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATES, AND HIGHER EDUCATION (The Johns Hop-
kins University Press 2004). 
 96  In certain fields, academic agendas are influenced by the pressure to obtain 
grants and patents; the promotion and reward system is set up in such a way that 
many researchers are altering their research trajectory to secure extramural funding 
and conform to institutional pressure to be self-supported on “soft money.” 
 97  See Lovejoy, supra note 40.  
 98  It would perhaps be difficult to argue legally that the state of Florida must 
fund travel to these terrorist countries. 
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the institution.99 The spending restrictions100 placed by the 
Travel Act interfere with the ability of Florida public colleges 
and universities’ to administer their mission of teaching, 
service, and particularly research.101 
Academic freedom is a “freedom” [i.e. a liberty marked by the 
absence of restraints or threats against its exercise] rather 
than a “right” [i.e. an enforceable claim upon the assets of 
others] in the sense that it establishes an immunity from the 
power of others to use their authority to restrain its exercise 
without, however, necessarily commanding a right of 
institutional subsidy for every object of professional endeavor 
that might engage the interest of the individual professor . . . . 
[A]cademic freedom would be abridged were any form of 
sanction threatened against a faculty member because of any 
of his professional pursuits, even assuming that the 
individual’s interest pertained to a subject that the institution 
declines itself to support and may thoroughly disapprove . . . . 
[T]he principle of academic freedom clearly condemns any act 
of institutional censure in respect to the professional 
endeavors of its faculty. 102 
The plaintiffs in this case are not individual faculty 
members, but the Faculty Senate of Florida International 
University—the concept of Freiheit der Wissenschaft (academic 
self-governance) advocates against legislative meddling in the 
affairs of the academy. 
In addition to deference to academic decisions, courts 
continually have recognized a special protection for academic 
 
 99  See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) 
(deciding whether the system to allocate student fees to campus organizations was 
viewpoint neutral Justice Souter said “[o]ur understanding of academic freedom has 
included not merely liberty from restraints on thought, expression, and association in 
the academy, but also the idea that universities and schools should have the freedom to 
make decisions about how and what to teach.” Id. at 237).   
 100  Similarly, Minnesota levied an ink tax against newspapers and structured its 
exemption to target certain newspapers. The Supreme Court held that singling out the 
press in such a way violated the First Amendment (Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. 
Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)). In F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of 
Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984), the Court found that Section 399 of the Public Broadcasting 
Act of 1967 violated the First Amendment by directing its funding restrictions at a cer-
tain form of speech—editorialized speech. 
 101  See Lynch, supra note 33, at 1082 (noting: “After finding that the academic 
speech lies within the state’s managerial domain, a court should ask whether the re-
striction of the professor’s speech is functionally necessary to accomplish the universi-
ty’s goals.”). 
 102  See Van Alstyne, supra note 22, at 147. 
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speech. In Rust v. Sullivan,103 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that the government may regulate and refuse to fund certain 
messages that it finds counter to its policy.104 That ruling, 
however, carved out an exception for academic speech,105 as 
faculty speech is not construed to be representative of the 
state106 and, per Keyishian;107 such restrictions are prohibited 
by the overbreadth108 and vagueness doctrines of the First 
Amendment.109 In Stanford v. Sullivan,110 the Court concluded 
that attempts at censorship were precisely what Rust 
excluded.111 
In Board of Education v. Pico,112 the Supreme Court ruled 
that there is no protection for the official suppression of ideas, 
particularly when the intent of the suppression is premised on 
content. It does appear that the intent of the Act was for 
Florida to set its own foreign policy, particularly as it applies to 
Cuba. Court record includes a quote from the sponsoring 
legislator, who said that the Travel Act was “‘designed to stop 
his constituents’ tax money from underwriting Fidel Castro’s 
regime.’”113 This came following the arrest of two FIU 
professors on charges of espionage.114 Reminiscent of 
McCarthy-era censorship and even post-September 11 fear,115 
 
 103  Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, (1991). 
 104  Id. 
 105  See Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 752 
(1995) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 200). 
 106  Id. at 796. 
 107  Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 108  The Travel Act is overly broad and vague. Would a faculty member be in vio-
lation if she wrote a letter of recommendation for a student to study in Cuba? Such an 
activity involves a state employee’s time and, hence, state funds. 
 109  Court dicta from Rust, 500 U.S. 173 states “[t]he university is a traditional 
sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Gov-
ernment’s ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached 
to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth 
doctrines of the First Amendment.” Id. at 200. 
 110  Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C. 
1991) (regarding confidentiality clause that researchers must get prior approval from 
the government and National Institutes of Health prior to publication). 
 111  Id. at 478−79. 
 112  Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 
(1982). 
 113  Faculty Senate of Florida Int’l Univ. v. Roberts, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1336 
(S.D. Fla. 2008) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Faculty Senate of Florida Int’l 
Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Marc Caputo & Oscar Corral, 
Law Bans Travel to “Terrorist States,” The Miami Herald, May 31, 2006, DE 19 at 36). 
 114  Faculty Senate of Florida Int’l Univ. v. Roberts, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.  
 115  The most notable post-September 11 case in academe was the dismissal and 
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to what extent does this purported concern for national 
security impede the freedom to pursue and disseminate 
knowledge?116 
The Pico decision also focused on the students’ right to 
receive information.117 The right of students to receive 
information and be educated fully hinges on faculty’s ability to 
exercise their right to free inquiry, as was reaffirmed in the 
AAUP’s 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure.118 
In Pickering v. Board of Education,119 a landmark case that 
laid the parameters by which public employees may enjoy free 
speech protection, the Court stated that the government must 
prove that a substantial disruption exists in order to suppress 
speech.120 In 1994, the Court reaffirmed that stance in Waters 
v. Churchill, holding that a higher standard existed the closer 
the speech in question related to an issue of public concern.121 
Most recently, the Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos122 did seem 
to limit some of the earlier speech-related freedoms established 
for public employees, finding that “when public employees 
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
 
subsequent arrest of Sami Al-Arian, professor at the University of South Florida, for 
suspected connections to terrorist organizations.  
 116  The plaintiffs elaborated in their briefs to the court that the Travel Act pro-
hibits faculty from applying for new grants and a significant amount of money has gone 
unspent from previously existing federal grants. Faculty Senate of Florida Int’l Univ. v. 
Roberts, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1349. 
 117  Pico, 457 U.S. at 867; see also Dana R. Wagner, The First Amendment and 
the Right to Hear, 108 YALE L. J. 669 (1998). Further, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 
U.S. 234 (1957), the Court noted that “students must always remain free to inquire, to 
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding.” Id. at 251. 
 118 Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure, BULL. AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS, Vol. 26, No. 1, at 49 (Feb. 1940) available at 
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1940statement.htm (stating 
that “teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the re-
sults.”). 
 119  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 
U.S. 563 (1968). 
 120  See Jeffrey S. Strauss, Dangerous Thoughts?, Academic Freedom, Free 
Speech, and Censorship Revisited in a Post-September 11th America, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 343, 356 (2004). The ruling in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), also ex-
tended that standard. 
 121  Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994), cited in Fugate, supra note 13, at 
211; in Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238 (2nd Cir. 1994), the Jeffries II court made a 
distinction about speech made in higher education needing more protection.  The Court 
ruled that the dismissal of the chair of the Black Studies department at City College of 
New York, because of comments he made criticizing the local public school district, was 
impermissible. 
 122  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
Blanchard Macro.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/27/14  9:54 PM 
204 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2014 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes.”123 Though many in education worried about the 
repercussions of that decision, there arguably is an exception 
carved out for faculty speech. In 2011, the Fourth Circuit—the 
same court that decided Urofsky124—ruled in Adams v. Trustees 
of UNC Wilmington125 that Garcetti was not intended to apply 
to universities.126 
First Amendment jurisprudence requires that there be a 
compelling government interest if there is a restriction on 
speech.127 What compelling interest exists in Florida to trump 
academic freedom? Are the restrictions being made on research 
in violation of the content neutrality standard?128 Even though 
the Supreme Court has carved out caveats for academic speech, 
is the “speech” in faculty work “purchased” by the employer?129 
Because of the guidelines inherent in the tenure and promotion 
process, the ability to research freely is central to and a 
necessary part of faculty employment. 
Another argument against the Travel Act would be the 
theory of unconstitutional conditions. The unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, first introduced in Lochner v. New York,130 
“provides that the government may not base the granting of 
public monies or other benefits on conditional terms, including 
conditions which force someone accepting those terms to 
surrender a right or rights otherwise protected by the 
Constitution.”131 The Supreme Court has held before that just 
because state funds are involved, universities cannot restrict 
speech.132 
 
 123  Id. at 421. 
 124  Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 125  Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 126  Id. at 563−64 (ruling in favor of a professor who had been denied promotion 
because of his unpopular activities as a Christian pundit). 
 127  See Strauss, supra note 117, at 347−48. 
 128  In the 1970s, the U.S. government funded research in countries in which we 
had hostile relations.  
 129  Courts have recognized a teacher exception to the work for hire doctrine of 
the Copyright Act. See e.g., Williams v. Weisser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726 (1969) (ruling 
that a faculty member had a right of ownership to course notes); Weinstein v. Univ. of 
Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987) (offering often used dicta against university efforts to 
exert ownership of faculty creations).  
 130  Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905) overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 
372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
 131 Byron V. Olsen, Rust in the Laboratory; When Science is Censored, 58 ALB. L. 
REV. 299, 330−31 (1994). 
 132  E.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (regarding the university’s uncon-
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Funding faculty research in these restricted countries does 
not interfere with the business of the government; if anything 
the Travel Act interferes with the business of the government 
by reaching beyond federal policies and regulations as well as 
the last two presidential administrations’ aims to foster 
educational exchange with Cuba and Iran.133 The Eleventh 
Circuit in its opinion remarked that the Act does not preclude 
faculty from travelling to these countries, just that it cannot be 
done at the expense of the state. How dangerous is it to 
presume that research will continue, particularly as faculty 
salaries are being cut? The knowledge faculty and students will 
have of these countries will be incorrect and outdated. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Just as the country was in fear during the McCarthy Era 
and Cold War, post-September 11 private citizens and public 
officials alike have allowed fear to play a part in their decision 
making process.134 Since September 11, professors have been 
investigated for holding dangerous or unpopular political 
beliefs to appease trustees and financial constituents.135 
Justice Thurgood Marshall warned, “[h]istory teaches that 
grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when 
constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.”136 The 
AAUP in its 1915 Statement warned against politics dictating 
academic policy. 
 
stitutional denial of official recognition of the Students for a Democratic Society), cited 
in David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in 
Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L REV. 675, 691 (1992). 
 133  In Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Bd. of Governors, 574 F. Supp. 2d 
1331, 1353 n.33 (S.D. Fla. 2008), the court cited a speech in which then-President Bush 
encouraged educational exchange with Iran. See also Karin Fischer, Obama Admin-
istration Eases Restrictions on Academic Travel to Cuba, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 
16, 2011, available at http://chronicle.com. 
 134  In February 2004, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets 
Control declared that American presses could be fined up to $1 million and jailed for up 
to ten years for publishing works authored in nations under trade embargoes. Beshara 
Doumani, Between Coercion and Privatization: Academic Freedom in the Twenty-First 
Century, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 19 (Beshara Doumani ed., 
2006).  
 135  Id. at 29 (speaking of incidents at Columbia and NYU of professors being crit-
ical of Israel and being labeled anti-Semite). 
 136  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), cited in Doug 
Rendleman, Academic Freedom in Urofsky’s Wake: Post September 11 Remarks on 
“Who Owns Academic Freedom,” 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 361, 364 (2002).  
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Where the university is dependent for funds upon legislative 
favor, it has sometimes happened that the conduct of the 
institution has been affected by political considerations; and 
where there is a definite governmental policy or a strong 
public feeling on economic, social, or political questions, the 
menace to academic freedom may consist in the repression of 
opinions that in the particular political situation are deemed 
ultra-conservative rather than ultra-radical.137 
In the past few years, politicians have begun attacking the 
“ivy walls”—a move that has popular favor among voters 
suffering from the recession and unconvinced that higher 
education should serve as anything but a vocational training 
ground.138 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to let stand the 
ruling in Faculty Senate of Florida International University v. 
Winn opens the door legally for even more political attacks on 
academic freedom. According to Jacques Derrida, “in a war of 
propaganda, ideas are weapons. They need to be honed and 
applied in service to your agenda and denied to the ‘enemy.’”139 
In Florida, the legislative power is redefining the terms of 
“allowable discourse.”140 As noted scholar Edward Said warned, 
“[t]o make the practice of intellectual discourse dependent on 
conformity to a predetermined political ideology . . . is to nullify 
intellect altogether.”141 If courts continue to allow these public 
attacks on academic freedom, political ideology may begin 
dictating the intellectual agenda. 
 
 
 
 137  See 1915 Declaration, supra note 1, at 31.  
 138  Some states, including Texas and Florida, considered eliminating tenure or 
linking promotion and merit to faculty evaluations and other tenuous criteria. A swell 
in anti-faculty union sentiment made headlines across several states in 2011, while 
voters saved the day by repealing a bill to eliminate bargaining units in Ohio. See 
Kaustuv Basu, Solidarity in Ohio, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Nov. 8, 2011, available at 
www.insidehighered.com.  
 139  David Barnhizer, A Chilling of Discourse, 50 ST. LOUIS L. J. 361, 420 (2006). 
 140  Id. at 421. 
 141  See David M. Rabban, Can Academic Freedom Survive Postmodernism? 86 
CALIF. L. REV. 1377, 1381 (1998) (quoting Edward Said, former professor and founder 
of post colonialism epistemology). 
